> ## Content Index > Fetch the complete content index at: https://onemanandhisblog.com/llms.txt > Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further. # Should we regulate digital communications and AI? - URL: https://onemanandhisblog.com/2026/11/should-we-regulate-digital-communications-and-ai/ - Published: 2026-11-12T14:01:48.000Z - Updated: 2026-11-12T14:01:48.000Z - Description: Philip Schlesinger's Jeremy Tunstall lecture explored the artificial conflict between innovation and regulation, and why we need to intervene in AI. - Author: Adam Tinworth - Tags: AI, regulation, Politics, big tech The title of [the third Jeremy Tunstall lecture](https://www.citystgeorges.ac.uk/news-and-events/events/2026/november/jeremy-tunstall-lecture-why-should-we-care-how-digital-communications-and-ai-are-regulated?ref=onemanandhisblog.com) was a question: > Why should we care how digital communications and AI are regulated? Professor in Cultural Theory at the University of Glasgow [Philip Schlesinger](https://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/cca/staff/philipschlesinger/?ref=onemanandhisblog.com)’s answer, delivered over a long and dense run through the state of play, was that we can’t afford not to. Regulation is no longer a niche concern for lawyers and policy wonks. It’s where geopolitics lands on our everyday information environment. But how did we get here? ## How we got here 👨‍💻 **These are live-blogged notes. Prone to error, inaccuracy and howling crimes against grammar and syntax. Post will be improved in the coming days (and this part of the warning removed).* Schlesinger’s starting point was the dominance of the big US tech players, which are now merging with the AI companies into an amorphous Big Tech blob. Their growing market power, he argued, is a general detriment to competition. Cybersecurity is rising to the top of the agenda precisely because of what AI can do, particularly in the hacking space, but also in its likely economic and societal impacts: the rules of the game that keep us safe have changed, and there’s a deep anxiety about a loss of social control. That raises questions about whether regulation works, and about the ethics of the new technology. Today’s struggles are both regional and profoundly global – Ukraine, Iran, the Red Sea. But none of this is new, or surprising. - During the Cold War, debates about communications were shaped by territorial and ideological arguments. - In the 1980s, France experimented with cultural protectionism. In an age of calls for digital sovereignty, those moves look more relevant again. - The arrival of the internet in the 1990s profoundly transformed communication, and with it politics, culture and society. Today’s geopolitical battles over regulation have important precedents. The chip wars aren’t a new battleground, but they matter far more to strategic calculations now. The pushback against Chinese tech on security grounds also happens to benefit the US tech industry – TikTok’s US business, remember, was forced into a sale into US ownership over security concerns. ## A turbulent hybrid system Press councils and film and TV standards bodies were the precursors of today’s communications regulators. But we’re now in a turbulent hybrid system, in which legacy media has been reshaped for the digital age. Three decades ago, when the “blogosphere” emerged, traditional media still mattered. Now professional journalism, and the role of sources, is being challenged by new entrants. Global streaming platforms have hit public service media, feeding a perception that the integrity of established media is eroding. TV policy is in fragments, with new actors battling for influence. The result is a crisis of systemic reliability: consumers are overloaded, and no longer sure who and what to believe. The post-truth era reflected a general decline in trust in experts. Anti-evidential thinking is a red rag to empiricists and rationalists alike, and regulation is too often conflated with censorship. Crisis conditions, he said, mean we need to think afresh. As public service media declines, journalists are fleeing the coop – becoming podcasters and, in his word, taking part in “Substackery”. A few players can dominate niches. And then comes AI, reshaping the whole field of communication. ## Digital empires and the splinternet Schlesinger identified three digital empires – the US, China, and the EU – with Russia a distinctive force, if not an empire in its own right. Each has a very different approach to regulation, rooted in its own ideological position. Regulators are always playing catch-up with technology, and the outcome is a splinternet: distinct regimes defined by regulatory control. The digital regulator, he suggested, is a firefighter in a society facing a crisis of trust. The [UK’s Online Safety Act](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-safety-act-explainer/online-safety-act-explainer?ref=onemanandhisblog.com), which dates from 2023, is an example. This year the government announced [a ban on many social platforms for under-16s](https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/articles/c6kg5ee1n758o?ref=onemanandhisblog.com) from next year. Similar policies were led by Australia and Canada, and the idea could spread globally. Whether it works is another matter: age verification is easily circumvented. He also pointed to the [National Centre for Information Defence](https://www.civilserviceworld.com/professions/article/pm-announces-new-national-unit-to-fight-hostile-state-information-attacks?ref=onemanandhisblog.com). France set up a [similar unit in 2021](https://cyber.gouv.fr/en/?ref=onemanandhisblog.com), and UK defence circles are keen to see ours become a well-funded agency. It’s no surprise, then, that communications and regulation have become so intertwined. Digital regulation, in an era when China and Russia are major adversaries, has become a form of democratic, financial and societal defence. ## Big tech, the US, and everyone else Schlesinger argued that the US stance towards digital regulation elsewhere is of a piece with longstanding American trade policy, and with the interests of big tech. Its allies aren’t exempt. He pointed to regular US pressure on the UK over how it regulates digital competition, and to a culture war over British immigration policy. The post-Brexit UK, he suggested, is a tiddler in this world. But its [Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum](https://www.drcf.org.uk/?ref=onemanandhisblog.com) has attracted interest and been adopted as a model in several other jurisdictions. The EU, unsurprisingly, is seen by US big tech as the main obstacle because it’s a regulatory state. He ran through its key tools: - The Digital Markets Act (2022), aimed at gatekeeper platforms and unfair business practices - The Digital Services Act (2022), regulating massive online platforms - The AI Act (2024), which provides the legal basis for a risk-based approach ## Regulation meets national security The other big shift he identified: geopolitical challenges and changing political cultures have pushed many states towards what he called widespread national securitisation. Since Russia’s war on Ukraine began, protecting critical infrastructure, building cyberwarfare capacity and military AI have all moved rapidly up the international agenda. Russia is the extreme case. Its [“sovereign internet” policy](https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/internet-fragmentation/russias-sovereign-internet-law/?ref=onemanandhisblog.com) involves systematic control of users’ access, and the blocking of opposition voices and foreign sites and platforms. The idea of an information war, he noted, has a long history. ### Disinformation and the retreat from self-regulation The EU set up a high-level expert group on fake news and online disinformation in late 2017, and content regulation became a key focus. That eventually fed into the provisions of the Digital Services Act. The tech companies initially agreed to self-regulation. Then, in 2023, they began to back away, and Meta and Google reduced their willingness to cooperate once President Trump returned for his second term. Compliance is still hotly contested – X’s [refusal to pay a fine imposed by the EU](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cq0m373ee0v0o?ref=onemanandhisblog.com), with the backing of the US government, is a case in point. The [European Democracy Shield](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-protecting-our-democracy-upholding-our-values/file-european-democracy-shield?ref=onemanandhisblog.com) was launched with a fanfare to counter foreign misinformation, manipulation and interference, mostly from Russia. Schlesinger’s doubt is whether monitoring, fact-checking and media literacy are up to the job. They all presume widespread respect for evidence, despite ideological differences, and a public culture in which citizens can – and will – learn how to handle the complexities of the digital media ecosystem. ## The geopolitics of AI Since OpenAI launched the first version of ChatGPT in November 2022, he said, the drumbeat of AI development has dominated public attention. And it’s not going away. We’ve crossed a threshold. You can’t ignore: - The eye-watering valuations of the major AI companies, and the growing risks to investors that come with them - The backlash against data centres hungry for water and energy, at a time when both are critical - The impact on workforces in several sectors, and on a new generation seeking employment - High-profile cases of AI models acting autonomously - The prospect of super-intelligence with the capacity to wipe out humanity It’s a debate in which economic, geopolitical, technological, ethical and ecological interests are all in play. And there are major divisions over whether regulation should have *any* role at all. Schlesinger’s focus was on how geopolitics has put AI regulation at the heart of that debate. Several leading figures in AI – including Anthropic’s Dario Amodei, OpenAI’s Sam Altman and Elon Musk – have called for some kind of regulation. Amodei’s version involves monitoring frontier models, industry safety standards and global coordination rules. Demis Hassabis of Google DeepMind described an extremely intense, multi-layered commercial and geopolitical race. He favoured a US AI standards body, applying tests with industry support. The US, he suggested, could compel everyone except China to comply, in something akin to a nuclear non-proliferation treaty that China would eventually join. Schlesinger observed that this was, among other things, an endorsement of US geopolitical advantage. ### The Trump factor The Trump position is different again. Schlesinger paraphrased it as the only guardrail AI needs is a smart president, and the US intends to stay ahead of China. That’s a rejection of public interest regulation in favour of discretionary action by developers, reflecting a determination to maintain market dominance. He noted that Trump’s position has been weakened by the Democrats’ success in the midterms, but that it’s too early to say what that does to US regulatory policy. The links between AI and US national security were underlined this week, he said, by the [Nvidia and Jensen Huang story](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/c6zjry11v8w1t?ref=onemanandhisblog.com), which has dragged what had been a somewhat arcane debate into popular culture. “Here’s another big tech spy story for the streamers.” Trump and Xi’s summit on 24 September left AI safety on the agenda. China does take regulation seriously – it has an AI Safety Framework 3.0 – though questions of global competition and the survival of humanity aside, AI’s potential threat to the party-state’s control is also part of the calculus. ## And the UK? Rishi Sunak convened an international AI summit, paving the way for a UK AI Safety Institute (now the [AI Security Institute](https://www.aisi.gov.uk/?ref=onemanandhisblog.com)). Regulation was off the agenda, in line with the prevailing view that it would impede innovation. The body’s new name signals a role in national defence. Regulation is still not a favoured term. Instead, we’re told that rigorous AI research will enable advanced AI governance, and the government’s AI minister has proclaimed scientific ingenuity a sufficient shield. Alongside it sits the [Cyber Security and Resilience Bill](https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/4035?ref=onemanandhisblog.com), focused on defending against cyberattacks and protecting critical public services. The UK’s position, he argued, encodes pressure from both the US administration and big tech, and the widespread belief that regulation will hamper the country’s ambition to be a global actor. ## Conclusion: the sovereign digital space Schlesinger’s conclusion was that the drive for digital sovereignty coincides with a more defensive definition of the boundaries of states. Because so much digital regulation is about managing boundary problems, it’s becoming more significant, and probably will keep doing so. In an age of polycrisis, regulation is becoming a key mechanism for addressing issues of order, with civil, intelligence and military agencies all deeply involved. That loads it with an increasingly complex burden of expectations, cutting across politics, culture, economics and social life. Given the speed of technological change – especially in AI – regulation will sometimes fail to deliver, creating space for controversy and a loss of confidence in institutional safeguards. His closing image: from an external adversarial perspective, the sovereign digital space is a protective wall to be breached. From an internal defensive perspective, it’s a site of potential vulnerability, requiring measures in a never-ending story of continued struggle. ![An older man with white hair and rimless glasses speaks and gestures with one raised hand while seated at a wooden desk, wearing a grey tweed jacket, black zip-up vest, lilac striped shirt and blue patterned tie.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/36/d8/36d823b7-59a1-4c8b-91bd-a54c64552596/content/images/2026/11/IMG_9822.jpeg) Philip Schlesinger answering questions at City St George's, University of London --- ## Audience Q&A ***Isn’t regulation always chasing a horse that’s already bolted? What could be done about what’s coming over the horizon?*** **PS**: If I accepted that proposition, there’d be no point in having the discussion. I don’t believe it because if we want to live in a society where we have some voice in how things are run, we have to take an interest. The problem is that in the UK and the US – less so the EU, though we don’t know what compromises are coming – innovation has become an objective that overrides all others, particularly for a country in trouble with its growth model. Treating “don’t let people innovate” as the route to disaster is, in my view, an act of faith. *He also wanted the debate to include the less apocalyptic risks. People are losing jobs in AI-affected industries, and that means damage to families and well-being. That has to be part of the conversation, rather than something left to experts. Even half-measures, he said, are better than no measures.* ***What if the state itself acts in bad faith? And what about companies that hesitate when asked whether humans should come first?*** **PS:** You can’t assume states are always benign. But there are things you can’t buy your way out of, even if you’re very rich and powerful. What has struck me most recently is how vulnerable 20 years of digital development has left us. Where there’s space for public action, and a reasonable chance that mobilising will produce positive outcomes, then do it. If you’re at risk of being thrown in jail, it’s a different calculation. ***Are there lessons from climate change as a global problem?*** **PS:** A lot. But also something else alongside the geopolitics: a kind of anti-evidentialism that globalises arguments to sow uncertainty, plus short-term and monetary decision-making. Is it easy? No. Do we have shining examples that make us optimistic? No. Should we do nothing? Also, no. Global agreement depends on the main players – the main offenders and the main beneficiaries – giving something up, and believing that trust in an agreement will last. It’s not an inspiring precedent, but it’s not a reason to throw up our hands. We may well be in a new game, and things are moving very fast. ***With the US dominating every layer of the AI stack, would a Democrat administration change the picture?*** *The questioner, a visiting retired professor of international politics, noted that the US controls the AI ecosystem at every level from chips up to data centres and applications, so any global regulation depends on Washington. Biden took the US back into global climate agreements – could a Democrat do the same here?* **PS:** The US is key. But we can’t be certain what happens in two years’ time, or how quickly any shift would show. The trajectory of US policy might not change much, and the US still holds a whole stack of power. China’s choices about whether and how to negotiate matter enormously, too, and that’s speculation on my part. --- ## My take This was a cogent call for transnational regulation of AI. Schlesinger was candid about the obstacle: territorial control issues, with each digital empire wanting to keep its hands on the wheel, will make global agreement challenging to achieve. We have to stop believing the lie that regulation will kill innovation. Why? Because the costs (and not just financial) of not regulating will be higher than the risks of stifling innovation.